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Abstract 
In this paper we develop a new approach for funding optimal government policies in 
economies with heterogeneous agents. Using the calculus of variations, we present three 
classes of equilibrium conditions from government's and individual agent's optimization 
problems: 1) the first order conditions: the government's Lagrange-Euler equation and 
the individual agent's Euler equation; 2) the stationarity condition on the distribution 
function; and, 3) the aggregate market clearing conditions. These conditions form a 
system of functional equations which we solve numerically. The solution takes into 
account simultaneously the e_ect of the government policy on individual allocations, the 
resulting optimal distribution of agents in the steady state and, therefore, equilibrium 
prices. We illustrate the methodology on a Ramsey problem with heterogeneous agents, 
finding the optimal limiting tax on total income. 
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a new approach for computing equilibria in which the stationary dis-
tribution of agents is a part of an optimal nonlinear, second-best government problem in
a general equilibrium, Bewley type economy with heterogeneous agents. We formulate
the optimal government policy problem as a calculus of variations problem where the gov-
ernment maximizes an objective functional subject to a system of operator constraints:
1) the first order condition for the individual agent’s problem; 2) the stationarity condi-
tion on the distribution function; and, 3) the aggregate market clearing conditions. The
first order necessary conditions of the government functional problem given by an Euler-
Lagrange equation (with transversality conditions) form a system of functional equations
in individual agents’ and government’s policies and in the distribution function over agents’
individual state variables. We solve this system numerically by the projection method.
Our main contribution is the derived Euler-Lagrange equation for the government prob-
lem and the operator formulation of the individual agent’s Euler equation and of the en-
dogenous stationary distribution. In this way, we are able to solve simultaneously for the
government optimal policy, for the optimal individual allocations, and for the (from a gov-
ernment’s point of view) optimal distribution of agents in the steady state. The first and
second order conditions, in the form of the Euler-Lagrange equation and a modified Legen-
dre condition, respectively, represent the necessary and sufficient conditions for concavity
and a unique maximum attained by the government policy function. There are two restric-
tions we impose on the solution: the government cannot use taxes that are state-contingent
(to preserve incomplete markets and heterogeneity in the economy) and, because of the
variational approach, the tax function must belong to the class of continuously differen-
tiable functions. We do not impose additional assumptions on the shape of the government
policy function. The optimal policy is derived from the first order and envelope conditions
and from the stationarity of the endogenous distribution in the steady state. To our knowl-
edge, this paper is the first one that provides a solution method for this kind of optimal
government problem in an economy with heterogeneous agents.
We formulate the government problem as a modified Golden Rule. That is, we solve for
an optimal limiting government policy under an assumption that the economy converges
to a steady state. The optimal limiting government policy is a long-run optimal outcome
that takes into account intertemporal discounting and the convergence to the steady state.
In a related paper, Davila, Hong, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2012) consider a social planner
that attains a constrained optimum by directly manipulating the savings decision of each
agent. They derive a functional first-order necessary condition with an added pecuniary
externality arising from general equilibrium effects and use the variational approach for
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its characterization. Compared with Davila et al. (2012), the contribution of our paper is
in the formulation of the Euler-Lagrange equations and the joint consideration of general
equilibrium and distributional effects of the optimal limiting tax policy function.
We illustrate this methodology on a Ramsey problem, solving for the optimal limiting
tax schedule on total income that maximizes average welfare in a steady state of a standard
neoclassical, dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete
markets calibrated as in Davila et al. (2012). For this calibration with a realistic wage
and wealth inequality, we compare steady state allocations corresponding to the optimal
limiting tax schedule with those related to a progressive tax schedule approximated by
Heathcote et al. (2016) and to a flat-tax reform.
The optimal limiting average tax schedule is a U-shaped function. The marginal tax
rates are also U-shaped, balancing a trade-off between the general equilibrium and the
distributional effect. The former effect arises from providing incentives to accumulate a
higher stock of aggregate capital that increases productivity of labor and, therefore, the
income of poor agents (the average price effect in Davila et al. (2012)). The latter effect
redistributes resources across agents in the stationary equilibrium. The marginal tax rates
at low incomes induce agents to save more in order to escape relative poverty and secure
better insurance against idiosyncratic risk, while the high tax rates on wealthy agents
provide resources for short-run redistribution.
Without agent-specific lump-sum transfers the optimal limiting tax schedule cannot
attain the constrained optimum in Davila et al. (2012). The optimal limiting tax function
only slightly increases the aggregate capital stock but significantly reduces inequality. We
compute transitions to the optimal limiting tax steady state and find that only when a
high initial capital stock can be consumed during a transition, the tax reform improves
welfare of the majority of the population. Following Farhi and Werning (2007), Farhi et al.
(2012), and Krueger and Ludwig (2018), we analyze the effects of the optimal limiting tax
schedule when the government puts different weights on current redistribution compared
to long-term equilibrium effects. Finally, we perform several sensitivity tests and discuss
important differences and effects from an alternative parameterization based on Aiyagari
(1994). The U-shape of the optimal limiting average tax schedule is obtained in most of
the simulated economies.
Our work contributes to recent advances in the literature on dynamic optimal taxation.
Throughout the paper we compare our methodology and results to Davila et al. (2012)
and show the equivalence of our Euler-Lagrange equation to the first-order condition of
their constrained efficiency problem. Several papers have also built on this seminar work:
Park (2017) adds an important dimension by introducing human capital. The first-order
condition with respect to human capital investment also has an extra term whose sign
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is opposite to that of savings. Because the planner can improve welfare only by altering
equilibrium prices, qualitative results of Davila et al. (2012) do not change. However,
endogenous human capital decreases inequality relative to the economy with exogenous
labor. Park (2014) derives positive capital income taxes from the pecuniary externality of
the aggregate capital stock in a limited commitment economy. Evans (2017) studies the
role of capital taxation in a model with uninsurable investment risk. The optimal capital
tax rate balances the pecuniary effect of increased savings with redistribution to agents
whose investment failed. Krueger and Ludwig (2018) analyze capital taxes in a Ramsey
economy where the pecuniary externality cancels out the precautionary savings effect.
Influential studies in the literature analyze the steady state implications of a flat-tax
or a capital income tax reform (Lucas (1990), Ventura (1999), and Conesa et al. (2009)),
or restrict the tax schedule to a specific functional form: Heathcote et al. (2016) and
Conesa and Krueger (2006) compute gains from the optimal progressivity of the income
tax code. Heathcote et al. (2017) allow the degree of tax progressivity to vary with age.
Bakis et al. (2015) apply the same parametric form to compute the optimal tax policy
for a dynastic economy. Useful insights have been obtained by imposing restrictions on
information available to the government in Golosov et al. (2003), Golosov et al. (2011),
Kapicka (2013), or Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2017). Our paper shows that narrowing the
analysis to monotone functions may be rather restrictive and that the shape of the opti-
mal tax schedule is sensitive to parameterization and the resulting stationary distribution
(see Mirrlees (1971), Saez (2001), Mankiw et al. (2009), or Diamond and Saez (2011)).
Compared with the Mirrleesian literature, it is the tax schedule that attains a steady state
where the endogenous distribution is optimal with respect to average welfare.
Finally, our paper adds to the new literature on quantitative methods. In a partial equi-
librium framework, Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2014) also use variational approach
to compute Gateaux differentials of local tax perturbations and look for a globally optimal
tax function that cannot be locally improved within a restricted class of tax functions.
For many realistic parameters the optimal marginal tax rates are also U-shaped. Pertur-
bation methods have been recently used to analyze the optimal government responses to
aggregate shocks. Bhandari et al. (2017a) study public debt in an economy where taxes
and transfers are chosen optimally subject to heterogeneous agents’ borrowing constraints
and the distribution of debt ownership. In Bhandari et al. (2017b), the Ramsey planner
optimally sets nominal interest rates, transfers and proportional labor taxes in response to
aggregate shocks in a New Keynesian model where agents are heterogeneous with respect
to co-movements of aggregate variables and measures of inequality.
In our example, we apply our methodology to an optimal limiting tax schedule on total
income from labor and capital. There are several reasons why we choose this setup. First,
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the tax on total income preserves incomplete markets with a non-degenerate distribution
of agents in a steady state. If the government had an access to a lump-sum, first best
taxation, the model would collapse to a representative agent one. Second, to a large extent
the current U.S. tax code does not distinguish between the sources of taxable income. The
last reason for a simple tax on total income is the complexity of the optimization problem.
We discuss how our methodology can be extended to address important issues with respect
to endogenous labor supply, taxation of capital income, borrowing constraints, government
debt, or more detailed life-cycle features.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section defines the stationary Ramsey
problem in a competitive equilibrium. Section 3 formulates the limiting Ramsey problem in
the calculus of variations. The necessary and sufficient conditions in terms of a generalized
Euler-Lagrange equations and Legendre condition are developed in Section 4. Sections
5 and 6 present an example with the optimal limiting income tax schedule. Section 7
concludes. Appendices contain proofs, additional results, and a sensitivity analysis.
2 The Economy
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived agents on a unit interval.
Each agent has preferences over consumption ct in period t ≥ 0, given by a utility function
E
∞∑
t=0
βtU(ct), 0 < β < 1, (1)
where U : R+ → R is a twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave function. We assume that the utility function satisfies the Inada conditions.
At all t ≥ 0, each agent is identified by an endogenous state variable, the accumulated
stock of capital, kt ∈ B = [k, k], and by a discrete, exogenous labor productivity shock
zt ∈ Z = {z, . . . , z}. We assume that there is a borrowing constraint that prevents the
individual savings from being negative. The lower bound could be motivated by solvency
constraints or by an explicit borrowing constraint. As is standard, the upper bound k is
set very high and verified not to be binding in equilibrium. The shock represents labor
efficiency units and follows a first-order Markov chain with a transition function Q(z, z′) =
Prob(zt+1 = z
′|zt = z). We assume that Q is monotone, satisfies the Feller property and
the mixing condition defined in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). The labor productivity
shock is independent across agents and we preserve the heterogeneity in the economy by
assuming incomplete markets: Agents do not have access to state-contingent contracts but
can only accumulate the risk-free capital stock.
In each period, agents inelastically supply labor and accumulated capital stock to a
5
representative firm with a production function F (Kt, Lt), where Kt ∈ B is the aggregate
capital stock, Lt ∈ R+ is the aggregate effective labor. The production function is con-
cave, twice continuously differentiable, increasing in both arguments, and displays constant
returns to scale. Profit maximization implies the following factor prices
rt = FK(Kt, Lt)− δ and wt = FL(Kt, Lt), (2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital.
Finally, there is a government that finances its expenditures by taxation. In order
to preserve incomplete markets and, therefore, heterogeneity in the economy, we impose
that the government cannot use state-contingent taxes. We assume that the government
cannot issue debt and is fully committed to a sequence of tax functions {pit}∞t=0 to finance its
expenditures equal to a fraction g of total output net of depreciation, not returned back to
the agents.1 The tax schedule is applied to a broadly defined taxable activity of each agent,
xt ∈ R+. We assume xt = x(zt, kt) where x : Z × B → R+ and xz, xk > 0. In each period,
the policy schedule is a twice continuously differentiable function pit : R+ → R, so that an
agent with a total income from labor and capital, yt ∈ R+, yt = y(kt, zt) = rtkt + wtzt,
and a taxable activity xt = x(kt, zt) pays taxes pit(xt) and is left with an after-tax income
yt − pit(xt).2 An individual budget constraint in each period is then
ct + kt+1 ≤ rtkt + wtzt − pit(xt) + kt.
The economy’s aggregate state is characterized by the sequences of government policies
{pit}∞t=0 and the distribution of agents over capital and productivity shock in each period,
{λt}∞t=0. The latter is in each period a probability measure defined on subsets of the state
space, describing the heterogeneity of agents over their individual state (z, k) ∈ Z×B. Let
(B,B) and (Z,Z) be measurable spaces, where B denotes the Borel sets that are subsets
of B and Z is the set of all subsets of Z. Agents have rational expectations and take
prices as given by equation (2). In order to determine prices, agents also have to know the
evolution of the distribution function from an initial distribution λ0, for each sequence of
government policies {pit}∞t=0.
The objective of the government is to choose a sequence of {pit}∞t=0 to maximize
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
z
∫
u(ct(z, k))λt(z, k)dk, (3)
1Specifying government expenditures net of depreciation simplifies the derivation of analytical prop-
erties that can be related to agents’ incomes. In numerical simulations we use the usual formulation of
expenditures as a fraction of total output. Our methodology equally applies to the case when government
finances any level of expenditures {Gt}∞t=0 and the corresponding revenue-neutral reforms.
2In Section 5, we compute an economy with a tax on total income, i.e. when x = y.
6
subject to agents’ optimal allocations in each period, equilibrium prices determined by the
aggregate capital stock and labor,
Kt =
∑
z
∫
kλt(z, k)dk, and Lt =
∫ ∑
z
zλt(z, k)dk, (4)
the government budget constraint,
g (F (Kt, Lt)− δK) =
∑
z
∫
pit(xt(z, k))λt(z, k) dk; (5)
and a law of motion of the distribution,
λt+1(z
′, B′) =
∑
z
∫
{(z,k)∈Z×B:ht(z,k)∈B′}
Q(z, z′)λt(z, k) dk, (6)
given an initial distribution λ0.
The government problem assigns equal weights to all agents. This utilitarian approach
is chosen for two main reasons. We prefer to start the economy from an initial distribution
λ0 where all agents have identical wealth and labor productivity. Second, assigning equal
weights to all agents allows us to treat identical agents identically and derive properties for
the long-run equilibrium associated with the optimal limiting government policy function.3
Definition 1 (Stationary Ramsey Problem) A solution to the Stationary Ramsey
Problem is a time-invariant limiting government tax policy function pi : R+ → R such
that pi = limt→∞ pit maximizes the government problem in (3)-(6).
Note that our analysis is not a pure steady state utility maximization. The optimal lim-
iting government policy is a long run optimal outcome that takes into account intertemporal
discounting and the convergence to the steady state. In other words, we study a steady
state under a modified Golden Rule. That is, we study a steady state of an economy for
which the optimal limiting government policy implies a convergence to that steady state.
2.1 Recursive Formulation
The limiting optimal policy pi needs to take into account its effects on equilibrium prices
and agents’ decisions.4 Define the value function of each agent as v : Z × B → R and the
savings function as h : Z × B → B. Given pi and equilibrium prices r(K) and w(K), an
3See Davila et al. (2012) for a similar discussion. The initial distribution is arbitrary.
4With exogenous labor supply, the aggregate labor converges deterministically to a constant due to the
law of large numbers. In the following exposition, we normalize the aggregate labor supply and write the
equilibrium prices as functions of the aggregate capital K only.
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agent (z, k) solves the following dynamic programming problem
v(z, k) = max
c,h
{
u(c(z, k)) + β
∑
z′
v(z′, h(z, k))Q(z, z′)
}
, (7)
subject to a budget constraint
c(z, k) + h(z, k) ≤ y(z, k) + k − pi(x(z, k)),
with a taxable activity x(z, k), total income y(z, k) = r(K)k + w(K)z, and a borrowing
constraint, h(z, k) ≥ k.
Definition 2 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) For a given share of government
expenditures g and the government policy pi on a taxable activity x, a recursive competi-
tive equilibrium is a set of functions (v, c, h), aggregate levels (K,L), prices (r, w), and a
probability measure λ : Z ×B → [0, 1], such that for given prices and government policies,
1. the policy functions solve each agent’s optimization problem (7);
2. firms maximize profit (2);
3. the probability measure evolves according to a law of motion,
λ′(z′, B′) =
∑
z
∫
{(z,k)∈Z×B:h(z,k)∈B′}
Q(z, z′)λ(z, k) dk, for all (z′, B′)∈Z×B; (8)
4. the aggregation conditions hold, K =
∑
z
∫
kλ(z, k)dk, and L =
∑
z
∫
zλ(z, k)dk;
5. the government budget constraint, g(F (K,L)− δK) = ∑z ∫ pi(x(z, k))λ(z, k)dk.
In the recursive formulation, the optimal limiting government policy maximizes
W (λ) = max
pi
∫ ∑
z
u(c(z, k))dk + βW (λ′), (9)
subject to allocations satisfying the conditions in Definition 2.5
The steady state of the economy corresponding to the limiting optimal government
policy pi is characterized by a time-invariant distribution λ. That the optimal limiting
government policy pi allows for a convergence to the steady state requires a regularity
condition on its properties. Denote the interval of individual savings at which an agent
with a productivity shock z is borrowing constrained as [k, k(z)]. For future reference also
denote k(z) as the highest savings by an agent with a current productivity shock z.
Assumption 1 (Regularity Condition) The government policy function pi is such that
for each z ∈ Z, the individual savings function h : Z × B → B is a strictly increasing
function for k > k(z) and is constant h(k, z) = k for k ∈ [k, k(z)].
5Note that if the allocations satisfy the definition of the recursive competitive equilibrium then they
are also feasible.
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A similar condition is required for the existence of a unique stationary recursive equilibrium
in all models with heterogeneous agents (see Stokey et al. (1989)). It implies that the
savings function does not display pathological features (for example, that wealthy agents
save less than poor agents) so that the stationary distribution has a unique ergodic set.
We want to make explicit here that this assumption is completely innocuous.6
3 Solution to the Stationary Ramsey Problem as a
Calculus of Variations Problem
Since the problem is to find an optimal limiting, welfare maximizing continuous function
pi ∈ C2(R+,R), we transform the Stationary Ramsey Problem into an operator form and
solve it by the calculus of variations.7 The calculus of variations is much more suitable for
solving a problem with complicated functional constraints and complex boundary condi-
tions than dynamic programming or optimal control methods.
In order to express the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium in this form, we
define two operators: on the Euler equation and on the stationary distribution. For a
given government policy function pi, the Euler equation operator F is defined on the savings
function h : Z×B → B. The distribution operator L is defined on the probability measure
λ : Z × B → [0, 1] and on the savings function h. We assume that these functions are
square integrable functions on some closed domain8: h, λ ∈ L2(Z × B) where L2(Z × B)
is a Hilbert space with the inner product (u, v) =
∫
Z×B u(t)v(t)dt. The operator F :
C1(Z × B) ⊂ L2(Z × B) → C1(Z × B) ⊂ L2(Z × B) is a mapping from a space of
continuously differentiable functions into a space of continuously differentiable functions;
and the operator L : C1(Z × B) × C1(Z × B) → C1(Z × B) ⊂ L2(Z × B). All functions
in the calculus of variations depend on the government policy pi and its derivative pix.
6The Regularity Condition guarantees that for all z ∈ Z, the government policy function pi is such that
for given prices determined by K, there exists an inverse function h−1 assigning a current value of capital
k to savings h according to k = h−1(z, h). The Regularity Condition is used only in the law of motion for
the distribution λ in the operator for the distribution function in equation (11). Davila et al. (2012) make
a similar assumption (an increasing savings function h, in Appendix). In their case the savings policy is
not distorted by a government policy function.
7Mirrlees (1976), Davila et al. (2012) or Golosov et al. (2014) use the same approach.
8In more precise terms we actually assume that the functions are from the subspace W 1,2(Z×B) which
contains L2(Z ×B)-functions which have weak derivatives of order one.
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Operator F on the Euler Equation An individual agent’s optimization problem in
(7) is characterized by the Euler equation with an operator9
F(h) ≡ uc(c)− β
∑
z′
uc(c
′) [1 + y′k − pix(x′)x′k]Q(z, z′), (10)
where in the next period c′ = y(z′, h(z, k)) − pi(x(z′, h(z, k))) + h(z, k) − h(z′, h(z, k)),
y′ = r(K ′)h(z, k) + w(K ′)z′, and x′ = x(z′, h(z, k)). The term [1 + y′k − pix(x′)x′k] is the
after-tax marginal return to capital when pix(x
′) is the next-period marginal government
policy. Finally, y′k = yk(z
′, h(z, k)) = r(K ′) is the marginal effect of individual savings on
total income and x′k = xk(z
′, h(z, k)) is the marginal effect of individual savings on the
taxable activity x′ next period.10 The operator equation is F(h) = 0.
Operator L on the Distribution Function Under the Regularity Condition, the op-
erator L for the distribution function in equation (8) is
L(λ, λ′, h) ≡ λ′(z′, k′)−
∑
z
Q(z, z′)
λ [z, h−1(z, k′)]
d
dk
h (z, h−1(z, k′))
, (11)
for all (z′, k′) ∈ Z × [h(z, k(z)), h(z, k(z))]. The operator equation is L(λ, λ′, h) = 0.
A variational approach to the Ramsey problem is based on a sequential formulation of
the government optimization problem. For descriptive purposes we present the recursive
formulation.11 Only two adjacent periods from the infinite time series are relevant for the
government maximization problem. For a given tax policy pi′ and a savings function k′′ in
the next period, and for a given distribution λ, the government chooses pi to maximize∑
z
∫
u
[
k(1 + r(K)) + zw(K)− pi(x)− k′]λ(z, k)dk
+β
∑
z′
∫
u
[
k′(1 + r(K ′)) + z′w(K ′)− pi′(x′)− k′′]λ′(z′, k′)dk′,
with the updating operator for the next-period distribution
λ′(z′, k′) =
∑
z
Q(z, z′)
λ [z, h−1(z, k′)]
d
dk
h (z, h−1(z, k′))
.
The term h−1(z, k′) denotes the value at k′ of the inverse of h for each z ∈ Z. We use a
change of variable k′ = h(z, k) to express dk′ = d
dk
h(z, k)dk. Merging the sums over z and
9In the text below, we present only the case of the unconstrained agents (for whom the Euler equation
holds with equality and h(z, k) > k). The case of borrowing constrained agents is in Appendix A.
10The Euler equation for an individual agent is standard. When the taxable activity equals total income,
F(h) ≡ uc(c)− β
∑
z′ uc(c
′) [1 + r(K ′)− pix(x′)r(K ′)]Q(z, z′).
11See Appendix for derivation and a similar discussion in Davila et al. (2012).
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the integration with respect to k, the optimal limiting tax function pi maximizes∑
z
∫ {
u[k(1 + r(K)) + zw(K)− pi(x)− h(z, k)]
+β
∑
z′
Q(z, z′)u
[
h(z, k)(1 + r(K ′)) + z′w(K ′)− pi′(x′)− k′′]}λ(z, k)dk,
where the aggregate capital stock in the next period equals
K ′ =
∑
z′
∫
k′
∑
z
Q(z, z′)
λ [z, h−1(z, k′)]
d
dk
h (z, h−1(z, k′))
dk′ =
∑
z
∫
h(z, k)λ(z, k)dk.
The Ramsey problem in the calculus of variations is then
max
pi
∑
z
∫ k(z)
k(z)
[
W(z, k; pi, pix) + β
∑
z′
Q(z, z′)W ′(z, z′, k; pi, pix)
]
λ(z, k)dk,
where
W(z, k; pi, pix) ≡ u[k(1 + r(K)) + zw(K)− pi(x(z, k))− h(z, k)],
W ′(z, z′, k; pi, pix) ≡ u[h(z, k)(1 + r(K ′)) + z′w(K ′)− pi′(x(z′, h(z, k)))− k′′].
We make explicit the dependence of operators W and W ′ on the tax function pi and also
on its derivative pix. Solving for the optimal tax function, we need to move from the
coordinates k to the taxable activity x = x(z, k).12 Therefore,
max
pi
∑
z
∫ x(z)
x(z)
[
W(z, x; pi, pix) + β
∑
z′
Q(z, z′)W ′(z, z′, x; pi, pix)
]
dλ(x), (12)
where
W(z, x; pi, pix) ≡ u[k(z, x)(1 + r(K)) + zw(K)− pi(x(z, x))− h(z, k(z, x))],
W ′(z, z′, x; pi, pix) ≡ u[h(z, k(z, x))(1 + r(K ′)) + z′w(K ′)− pi′(x(z′, h(z, k(z, x))))− k′′],
dλ(x) ≡ λ(z, k(z, x))kx(z, x).
The bounds on taxable activity, x(z) and x(z), for each z ∈ Z, are endogenous functions of
a chosen government policy. The lower bound x(z) = x(z, k) depends on z, on the exoge-
nously given lower bound on capital k, and on the equilibrium prices. Similar arguments
apply to the upper bound x(z) = x(z, k).13
12The taxable activity x is now the independent variable and k = k(z, x) is its function. We want to
stress again the dependence of the operator W and W ′ on the aggregate capital stock K and K ′ through
general equilibrium effects, although it is not written as one of its arguments.
13Clearly, the maximal interval is [x(z), x(z)] where x(z) is the lower bound of the lowest shock, z, and
x(z) is the upper bound of the highest shock, z. So any taxable activity interval associated with a shock
z ∈ Z is a subinterval of the maximal interval, [x(z), x(z)] ⊂ [x(z), x(z)].
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The aggregate capital stock in the next period is defined as
K ′ ≡
∑
z
∫ x(z)
x(z)
h(z, k(z, x)) dλ(x), (13)
and the side conditions for the government budget constraint is∑
z
∫ x(z)
x(z)
G[z, x; pi, pix] dλ(x) = 0, where G[z, x; pi, pix] ≡ pi(x)− gy(z, k(z, x)). (14)
Definition 3 (Calculus of Variations Ramsey Problem) The Ramsey Problem in
the calculus of variations is a generalized isoperimetric maximization problem (12), sub-
ject to the government budget constraint (14), with the individual policy function h given
implicitly by the operator Euler equation F(h) = 0, the law of motion for the distribution
function, λ, given implicitly by the operator equation L(λ, λ′, h) = 0, the aggregate capital
stock (13), the endogenous bounds of taxable activity, x(z) and x(z), for all values of z ∈ Z,
and the free values of the government policy at the extreme lower and upper bounds.
Note that since the upper bounds k(z) are endogenous, the endpoints x(z) are equality
constrained. This might be also true for the lower bounds k(z) and their endpoints x(z).
4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Station-
ary Government Policy Function
In this Section we derive the first-order necessary and second order sufficient conditions for
the optimal limiting government policy function. In order to derive these conditions in the
calculus of variations, we need to specify the derivatives of the functionals W and G with
respect to marginal changes in government policy, pi and pix. For this purpose, we use the
concept of generalized derivatives on mappings between two Banach spaces (B-spaces), the
Fre´chet derivatives. The Fre´chet derivative is a generalization of the concept of a derivative
on functional and operator spaces (see Luenberger (1969) or Ok (2007)).14
Definition 4 (Fre´chet Derivative) Given a nonlinear operator N (u) on function u, the
Fre´chet differential δN (u; δh) = Nuδh is
lim
‖δh‖→0
‖N (u+ δh)−N (u)−Nuδh‖
‖δh‖ = 0,
14The compliance of the Fre´chet derivatives (also called the F-derivatives) with the derivations of the
first order conditions in the calculus of variations is reflected by the fact that the F-differential is identical
to the variation. Our derivations are more complicated than the standard Fre´chet derivative because our
functional equations are recursive. Practically, the Fre´chet derivative can be obtained using a weaker
concept of the Gateaux derivative Nu = limε→0N (u+ εδh)/ε when the obtained derivative is continuous.
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where Nu is the Fre´chet derivative.
Define the Lagrange function L for the Calculus of Variations Ramsey Problem in
Definition 3, for each z ∈ Z, as
L(z, x) =

0 for x ∈ [x(z), x(z)),
W(z, x) + µG(z, x) for x ∈ [x(z), x(z)],
0 for x ∈ (x(z), x(z)].
(15)
Note that the social welfare function is the sum of integrandsW(z, x) =W [z, x; pi(x), pi′(x)]
integrated on intervals [x(z), x(z)] for each z ∈ Z. The same is true for integrands L(z, x).
Theorem 1 (First Order Necessary Conditions) Using a modified Lagrange function
L˜ for the Calculus of Variations Ramsey Problem in Definition 3,
L˜(z, x) =

0 for x ∈ [x(z), x(z)),
[L(z, x) + β
∑
z′ Q(z, z
′)L′(z, z′, x)]λ(z, x)kx(z, x) for x ∈ [x(z), x(z)],
0 for x ∈ (x(z), x(z)],
for each z ∈ Z, the first order necessary conditions for the Ramsey problem are
1. the Euler-Lagrange equation,∑
z
(
L˜pi(z, x)− d
dx
L˜pix(z, x)
)
= 0; (16)
2. the transversality condition on the free boundary value, pi(x(z)), at the equality con-
strained endpoint, x(z),[
L˜(z, x)−
(
pix(x)− kx(z, x)
ωpi(z, x)
)
L˜pix(z, x)
]
x=x(z)
= 0; (17)
3. the transversality condition on the free boundary value, pi(x(z)), at the equality con-
strained endpoint, x(z),[
L˜(z, x)−
(
pix(x)− kx(z, x)
ωpi(z, x)
)
L˜pix(z, x)
]
x=x(z)
= 0; (18)
4. and the condition on the Lagrange multiplier, µ, at which (14) is satisfied.
Proof At the endogenous upper bound the endpoint is equality constrained. If the extreme
lower bound is exogenous, then the condition 3 simplifies to L˜pix(z, x)|x=x(z) = 0. For the
proof and more detailed specifications of all terms see the Appendix.
The total variation with respect to the tax schedule is equal to the sum of the total
variation of utilities and the total variation of the budget constraint weighted by the shadow
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price µ in two consecutive periods. The total variation with respect to the optimal limiting
tax policy schedule, i.e. pi = limt→∞ pit, is equal to zero. Denoting ∆ ≡ δδpi − ddx δδpix as the
operator for the total variation, the Euler-Lagrange equation is simply
∑
z ∆L˜ = 0.
The Lagrange-Euler conditions in Theorem 1 contain the tradeoff between the tax level,
pi, and its curvature captured by the marginal tax rate, pix. At the optimum, the marginal
effect of a change in the level of the tax schedule pi on social welfare, L˜pi, has to be equal
to the marginal effect of an implied change in the tax schedule curvature expressed by the
derivative of the implied change, d
dx
L˜pix , due to the changing marginal tax rate, pix.
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Lemma 1 The Euler-Lagrange equation (16) can be written as∑
z
{[
− uc(c) + β
∑
z′
Q(z, z′)uc(c′)[1 + r − pix(x′)x′k]
]
h∗pi (19)
−uc(c) + µ
+β
∑
z′
Q(z, z′)
(∫
ψ(z, z′, x)
[
uc(c
′)− µg]h∗piλ∗(z, k(z, x))kx(z, x)dx+ µξ(z, z′, x)h∗pi)
− d
dx
[
β
∑
z′
Q(z, z′)
(∫
ψ(z, z′, x)
[
uc(c
′)− µg]h∗pixλ∗(z, k(z, x))kx(z, x)dx+ µξ(z, z′, x)h∗pix)]
−ελ∗kxx (z, x)
}
λ∗(z, k(z, x))kx(z, x)dx ≤ 0,
where
ψ(z, z′, x) ≡ h∗(z, k(z, x))rK(K∗) + z′wK(K∗),
ξ(z, z′, x) ≡ pix(x(z′, h∗(z, k(z, x))))xk(z′, h∗(z, k(z, x)))− gr(K∗),
ελ
∗kx
x (z, x) ≡
d
dx
(λ∗(z, k(z, x))kx(z, x))
λ∗(z, k(z, x))kx(z, x)
= ελ
∗
x (z, x) + ε
kx
x (z, x),
Proof The Euler-Lagrange equation results from a substitution of terms defined in Ap-
pendix B into Theorem 1.
The government constructs its optimal limiting tax schedule by balancing the distribu-
tional effect on the individual savings function, h∗, and the general equilibrium effect on
the aggregate capital stock. The first line in the Euler-Lagrange equation (19) represents
an agent’s intertemporal first-order condition that takes into account the tax schedule and
is zero except for the borrowing-constrained agents.16 In the second line the optimal limit-
ing tax schedule directly affects the disposable income and, therefore, the marginal utility
15If we restrict the tax policy to be only a flat tax and the marginal tax rate is constant, the first-order
conditions degenerate to the standard optimization problem L˜pi(z, x) = 0.
16The Euler-Lagrange equation is written with inequality as it includes agents at the lower bound. If
written with equality, the transversality condition at the lower bound applies to the case of borrowing
constrained agents.
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of consumption in the current period, −uc(c), counterbalanced by an opposite effect of
the Lagrange multiplier, µ, on the government budget constraint. The indirect effects of
agents’ savings, h∗pi, are aggregated to changes in the next-period aggregate capital stock
weighted by marginal utility, β
∑
z′ Q(z, z
′)
∫
ψuc(c
′)h∗piλ
∗kxdx. In a similar way the shape
of the tax schedule influences the equilibrium through the effect of the marginal tax rate pix
on individual savings function, h∗pix , expressed by β
∑
z′ Q(z, z
′)
∫
ψuc(c
′)h∗pixλ
∗kxdx. Note
that both aggregate effects arise through the sensitivity functions h∗pi and h
∗
pix . Finally, the
last line of the Euler-Lagrange equation is the semi-elasticity of the transformed distribu-
tion function with respect to the taxed activity, ελ
∗kx
x . It can be decomposed into a sum of
the semi-elasticity of the distribution function and the semi-elasticity of the related capital
kx with respect to x.
The pecuniary externality effect operates through changes in equilibrium prices and
can be written as in Davila et al. (2012),
ψ(z, z′, x) = rK(K∗)K∗
(
h∗(z, k(z, x)))
K∗
− z
′
L
)
.
For a labor intensive income the term in the brackets is negative and ψ > 0 (since rK < 0).
Compared to Davila et al. (2012), the government budget constraint causes addi-
tional pecuniary externality effects. First, there are aggregate capital effects on the
government budget balance through the change of the tax rate and the marginal tax
rate, −gβ∑z′ Q(z, z′) ∫ ψuc(c′)h∗piλ∗kxdx, and −gβ∑z′ Q(z, z′) ∫ ψuc(c′)h∗pixλ∗kxdx. Sec-
ond, individual savings decisions impact the government budget constraint through
the change in the tax schedule, ξ(z, z′, x) = [pix(x′)xk(x′) − gr(K∗)]h∗pi. The first
term captures the change in tax contributions and the second the change in govern-
ment spending due to the change in the agent’s capital income. The total effect is
β
∑
z
∑
z′ Q(z, z
′)µξ(z, z′, x)h∗piλ
∗(z, k(z, x))kx(z, x)dx, weighted by λ∗(z, k(z, x))kx(z, x)dx
across all agents with (z, x). A similar decomposition applies to marginal tax changes h∗pix .
Finally, to relate our results to Davila et al. (2012), we formulate the Euler-Lagrange
equation for their constrained efficiency problem in which the social planner manipulates
savings of each agent. As each agent receives back a lump-sum transfer equal to changes
in investment, there is neither the government budget constraint (Lagrange multiplier µ)
nor the direct tax effect on disposable income, −uc(c). Since the tax is not a function of
x, the terms with pi(x) as well as d/dx will disappear from the equation. As the social
planner chooses savings directly, h∗pi = 1. The first-order condition is then
−uc(c) + β
∑
z′
Q(z, z′)uc(c′)[1 + r]
+β
∑
z
∑
z′
Q(z, z′)
∫
ψ(z, z′, x)uc(c′)λ∗(z, k(z, x))kx(z, x)dx ≤ 0,
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identical to the first-order condition in Davila et al. (2012) with the last term equal to
the extra term ∆.17 In our formulation, the function ψ is weighted by agents’ marginal
utilities and the whole term also enters an individual agent’s Euler equation as a number.
Theorem 2 (Second Order Sufficient Conditions) A tax schedule pi satisfying the
first-order conditions in Theorem 1 attains a strict maximum if and only if (i) the La-
grange function defined in equation (15) satisfies the second-order Legendre condition∑
z∈Z
L˜pixpix(z, x) < 0 for all x ∈ [x(z), x(z)] ,
and (ii) the interval [x(z), x(z)] contains no points conjugate to x(z).
Proof For the proof see the Appendix.
The Euler-Lagrange equation in Theorem 1 and the modified Legendre condition in
Theorem 2 represent necessary and sufficient conditions for concavity and a unique maxi-
mum of the Calculus of Variations Stationary Ramsey Problem. In the following Sections
we illustrate these effects numerically.
4.1 The Effects of Government Policy on the Equilibrium
If we knew how agents’ saving policies h and simultaneously how the distribution λ depend
on the government policy schedule, i.e. if we could solve at equilibrium prices for the optimal
policy which is a function of the distribution and prices which in turn are determined by
h(·) which is itself a function of the optimal policy and prices, the task of the derivation of
the first order conditions for this dynamic optimization would be straightforward. However,
not only we have to solve for these functions simultaneously but also we are in a much more
difficult situation since for any government policy schedule, agents’ saving policy and the
distribution functions are known only implicitly as a solution to the two operator equations
(F(h) = 0 and L(λ, λ′, h) = 0) and the aggregate conditions for equilibrium prices.
The next Lemma derives the effects of the government policy function pi on the operator
Euler equation by specifying four unknown “sensitivity” functions hpi : Z × B −→ R,
hpix : Z ×B −→ R, hpixpi : Z ×B −→ R, and hpixpix : Z ×B −→ R. Denote the next-period
after-tax marginal return to capital as R′ = 1 + y′K − pix(x′)x′K .
Lemma 2 (The Effects of pi and pix on the Euler Equation) The total F-derivati-
ves of the operator Euler equation F with respect to the government policy function pi
17Note that the summation over current shocks z disappears as the planner chooses allocations contingent
on each shock. The Euler-Lagrange equation for a flat-tax schedule is in the Appendix.
16
and to its derivative pix are
Fi = ucc(c)ci − β
∑
z′
Q(z, z′)
{
ucc(c
′)c′iR
′ + uc(c′)R′i
}
= 0, (20)
where the subscript denotes derivatives with respect to i ∈ {pi, pix}, and
Fij = uccc(c)cicj + ucc(c)cij − (21)
β
∑
z′
Q(z, z′)
{[
uccc(c
′)c′ic
′
j + ucc(c
′)c′ij
]
R′ + ucc(c′)
[
c′iR
′
j + c
′
jR
′
i
]
+ u′(c′)R′ij
}
= 0.
where the subscripts denote derivatives with respect to ij ∈ {pixpix, pixpi}.
Proof For the proof and a full definition of terms see the Appendix.
We obtain five functional equations (10), and (20)-(21) in unknown functions h, hpi, hpix ,
hpixpix , and hpixpi, respectively. Finally, by adding the first-order conditions from Theorem
1, and the functional equation for the distribution function, λ, the problem of finding the
optimal government policy pi is a system of seven functional equations in seven unknown
functions with two side conditions and one condition on the Lagrange multiplier.
5 An Example: The Optimal Income Tax Schedule
In this section we demonstrate our method by finding the optimal limiting government
policy pi defined as a tax on total income from capital (net of depreciation) and labor. The
taxable activity is
x(z, k) = y(z, k) = r(K)k + w(K)z,
and the individual budget constraint is
c(z, k) + h(z, k) ≤ x(z, k)− pi(x(z, k)) + k.
As before, there is a borrowing constraint k = 0 and the total tax revenues are equal to
a fraction g of the total output. In the abbreviated notation, the Euler equation for a
(z, k)-agent’s optimal savings function h is now
u′(c) ≥ β
∑
z′
u′(c′) [(1 + r(K ′)− pi(x′)r(K ′)]Q(z, z′),
where c′ = x′ − pi(x′) + h − h′, x′ = r(K ′)h + w(K ′)z′, and h′ = h(z′, h(z, k)). Note that
for this specification xk = yk = r(K) and kx = 1/xk = 1/r(K).
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5.1 Admissible Tax Functions
Because the tax schedule is an arbitrary continuous function, we must ensure that the
first-order approach is valid and that the stationary recursive equilibrium exists.18 In
order to characterize the admissible tax functions and to prove the Schauder Theorem for
economies with distortions, we follow the notation in Stokey et al. (1989). For each agent
(z, k) ∈ B×Z, denote the after-tax gross income as ϕ(z, k) ≡ x(z, k)−pi(x(z, k)) + k, and
rewrite the Euler equation as
u′(ϕ(z, k)− h(z, k)) = β
∑
z′
u′(ϕ(z′, h(z, k))− h(z′, h(z, k)))ϕk(z′, h(z, k))Q(z, z′),
where ϕk(z
′, h(z, k)) = 1 + r(K ′)− pix(x(z′, h(z, k)))r(K ′) is the marginal after-tax return
of investment.
Theorem 3 For a given tax schedule pi : R+ → R, if for each (z, k) ∈ B×Z, ϕk(z, k) > 0,
and ϕ is quasi-concave, then the solution to each agent’s maximization problem and the
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium exist.
Proof See the Appendix.
The following corollary characterizes the set of admissible tax functions.
Corollary 1 (Admissible Tax Functions) Let C2(R+) be a set of continuously differ-
entiable functions from R+ to R. If a tax function pi ∈ C2(R+) belongs to the set of
admissible tax functions Υ,
Υ =
{
pi ∈ C2(R+) : pix(x) < 1 + 1
r(K)
}
for all x ∈ [r(K)k+w(K)z, r(K)k+w(K)z], then it satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.
The above statement follows directly from the fact that ϕk(z, k) > 0 and that ϕ is quasi-
concave. The corollary implies that the marginal tax rate must be smaller than 1+1/r(K).
This upper bound is not likely to bind for a very wide range of tax schedules.19 Application
of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 then implies necessary and sufficient conditions for the unique
maximum attained by the tax schedule.
18Again, we analyze the case of borrowing constrained agents in the Appendix.
19For the targeted equilibrium interest rate in the progressive-tax steady state r = 0.04, the upper bound
on the marginal tax rate is equal to 26. When numerically solving for the optimal tax schedule in the
next Section we do not impose any bounds on the marginal tax rate but we check the admissibility of the
optimal tax schedule ex post.
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Table 1: Parameters of the Benchmark Economy
β = 0.9309 σ = 2.0 α= 0.36 δ = 0.08 g=0.189
Earnings Process (Davila et al. (2012)):
z ∈ Z = {1.000, 5.290, 46.550} Q(z, z′) =
0.992 0.008 0.0000.009 0.980 0.011
0.000 0.083 0.917

6 Numerical Solution
In this Section we solve for the optimal limiting tax schedule and compare the associated
steady state allocations to those resulting from the progressive tax schedule in the U.S.
economy and from the usual flat-tax reform. In order to evaluate welfare implications, we
conduct a transition analysis.
We use the same calibration as Davila et al. (2012). The three-state, first order
Markov process of the uninsurable idiosyncratic shock to labor productivity is based on
Diaz-Jimenez et al. (2003) with large and asymmetric wage risk necessary for a realis-
tic dispersion of both earnings and wealth. We set the discount factor so that in the
progressive-tax steady state the capital-output ratio equals 3 and the equilibrium interest
rate is 4 percent. Other parameters in Table 1 are standard, α = 0.36, δ = 0.08, and
the risk aversion parameter σ = 2 (intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1/2). The
stationary distribution of productivity shocks is {0.498, 0.443, 0.059}.
We model the progressive tax schedule as Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2016)
by specifying a tax on total income as a function
piPT (y(z, k)) = y(z, k)− χy(z, k)1−τ ,
where τ is a parameter of the rate of progressivity and χ is a level parameter that clears the
government budget constraint. The tax function is progressive if 0 < τ < 1 with strictly
increasing marginal tax rates.20 For the U.S. economy, Heathcote et al. (2016) estimate
from the 2000-2006 PSID data that τ = 0.161. In each period the government is required
to collect tax revenues equal to 18.9% of the total output. As depreciation of capital is
deducted from taxable income, in the flat-tax rate steady state τ = g/(1− δK/Y ).
The optimal limiting tax policy is a solution to the system of functional equations
defined in Theorem 1, the functional equation for the stationary distribution λ, the two
side conditions, and the Lagrange multiplier condition. We solve this functional equations
problem by the least squares projection method described in Appendix C. Definitions of
functional equations are in Appendix D, together with additional results and a sensitivity
analysis for different parameters of risk aversion.21 In Appendix E we also compute an
20Examples of monotone tax functions are Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Gouveia and Strauss (1994).
21The least squares projection method is an efficient and well-behaved method for functional equations
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Figure 1: The optimal average tax rate and the optimal marginal tax rate.
alternative calibration for a low wealth dispersion economy based on Aiyagari (1994).
6.1 Steady State Results
The optimal limiting average tax schedule is U-shaped. In Figure 1, the average tax rate
at the lowest total income is 14%, decreases to a minimum of 2%, and rises to 48% at the
highest level of total income. The marginal tax rates are also U-shaped: close to zero for
low incomes, negative at medium incomes, and positive at higher income levels.22
Table 2 shows steady state outcomes of the progressive, flat, and optimal limiting tax
schedules. Under the progressive tax, the persistent earnings process generates a large
fraction of poor agents and a substantial right tail of the wealth distribution with a Gini
coefficient of wealth above 0.8, exactly as in Davila et al. (2012). The flat-tax reform
increases the aggregate capital stock by 31% and output by 10%, while only slightly in-
creasing inequality. The optimal limiting income tax increases the aggregate capital stock
by only 3 percent. The coefficient of variation of wealth falls substantially and the Gini
coefficient of wealth inequality becomes 0.698. While in the progressive- and flat-tax steady
problems. For a detailed explanation of applying projection methods to stationary equilibria in economies
with a continuum of heterogeneous agents see Bohacek and Kejak (2002).
22The optimal limiting tax schedule easily satisfies the admissibility condition in Corollary 1. Similar
marginal tax rates are found in dynamic models of Kapicka (2013) or Golosov et al. (2011) and in static
models of Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001). Building on Mirrlees (1971) and Mirrlees (1976) seminal
work, Kocherlakota (2005), Golosov et al. (2003), or Albanesi and Sleet (2006) study optimal social
planner policies with asymmetric information needed for characterization of optimal policies.
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Table 2: Steady State Results
Progressive Flat Optimal
τ 0.161 0.265 —
Aggregate assets 3.000 3.934 3.093
Output 1.000 1.102 1.011
Capital-output ratio 3.000 3.568 3.059
Interest rate (%) 4.000 2.092 3.771
Coeff. of variation of wealth 2.125 2.313 1.501
Gini wealth 0.812 0.838 0.698
Perc. of wealth of the top 5% 0.433 0.475 0.276
states the top five percent of richest agents hold more than 40 percent of all assets, the
optimal limiting tax schedule lowers this share to 27.6 percent.
There are two important effects the optimal limiting tax schedule takes into account.
The first is the general equilibrium price effect derived in Davila et al. (2012). Poor agents
in the benchmark economy have labor intensive incomes and an increased aggregate capital
stock improves their welfare through higher equilibrium wages: the extra term defined in
Davila et al. (2012) is positive in all our simulations, suggesting an overaccumulation of
capital in a competitive equilibrium relative to the constrained efficient allocation by a
social planner.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of savings to changes in the tax schedule hpi.
The second, distributional effect is related to agents’ insurance and mobility within the
stationary distribution. The large and persistent dispersion of earnings makes redistribu-
tion important. While in Davila et al. (2012) the wealthy agents are only induced to save
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Table 3: Steady State Distribution of Assets and Tax Contributions
Assets Tax Contributions
Progress. Flat Optimal Progress. Flat Optimal
1st Quintile 0.1 0.1 0.2 -3.4 5.8 2.6
2nd Quintile 0.2 0.2 0.3 -3.4 5.9 2.9
3rd Quintile 1.7 1.5 8.1 4.0 14.4 3.3
4th Quintile 9.9 7.0 18.8 9.6 16.4 4.3
5th Quintile 88.3 91.9 72.7 89.9 57.4 89.5
Top 10% 66.4 71.6 48.5 81.7 54.3 87.0
Top 5% 43.3 47.5 27.6 64.5 41.1 76.3
Top 1% 12.1 13.5 6.6 14.5 8.8 17.4
Note: Each entry is the percentage share of assets owned or taxes paid by each group.
more, under the optimal limiting tax schedule they are taxed in order to provide transfers
to agents with high marginal utility. Figure 2 shows the sensitivity functions of savings to
changes in the optimal tax schedule, hpi, for three labor productivity shocks zL < zM < zH .
The response of savings by agents with the low and medium productivity shocks is negligi-
ble across the ergodic set of the wealth distribution as all perturbations of the tax schedule
are consumed by the agents. Only agents with the highest labor productivity alter their
savings: a perturbation of the convex increasing tax schedule reduces savings, hpi(k, z) < 0.
The substantial right tail of the income distribution contributes a large fraction of the
total tax revenues. Table 3 shows that the optimal tax schedule puts most of the tax burden
on the top decile of the wealth distribution. The top decile pays almost 90 percent and
the top five percent pays more than 3/4 of the total tax revenues, respectively, much more
than in the progressive-tax steady state. For a comparison, the flat-tax reform dramatically
increases the aggregate capital stock without taking into account the distribution of agents.
Under the flat tax, the share of the tax burden of the top decile is only 54.3% of all tax
contributions compared to above eighty percent in the other steady states.
In general, the low and initially decreasing marginal tax rates of the limiting optimal
tax policy insure poor agents and improve efficiency by lowering distortions in the economy.
The marginal tax rates motivate the savings of poor agents towards the desired aggregate
capital level while the increasing rates on high incomes deliver revenues for redistribution.
The optimal limiting tax schedule lowers the share of assets held by the top quintile to
72.7%; the top decile owns less than one half of total assets. This redistribution is reflected
in the low wealth inequality in the optimal limiting tax steady state.
6.2 Welfare Gains from the Optimal Limiting Tax Schedule
The top part of Table 4 shows that the optimal tax schedule delivers large average welfare
gains in the steady state, 1.7% and 6.1% with respect to the progressive and the flat
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Table 4: Welfare Gains from the Optimal Tax Schedule (in %)
Progressive Flat
Steady State 1.735 6.129
Transition
Average Welfare -0.767 14.884
Aggregate Component -0.580 5.670
Distributional Component -0.188 8.720
Political Support 46.471 94.129
tax steady state, respectively.23 Because a pure steady state comparison involves different
stationary distributions and ignores transition costs, the rest of Table 4 shows welfare gains
in terms of expected present discounted values from an unanticipated reform in which the
optimal limiting tax schedule is imposed on the initial progressive- or flat-tax steady state.24
We adopt the approach of Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and decompose the average welfare
gain into an aggregate and a distributional component. The former denotes a hypothetical
expected present value of per-period consumption if a household consumes each period the
same fraction of aggregate consumption as in the pre-reform steady state. The latter is
the difference between the average welfare gain and the aggregate component.25
Imposing the optimal limiting tax schedule on the progressive-tax steady state leads
to short-run costs in both distributional and aggregate components. The progressive tax
steady state provides better short-time insurance to the poorest agents as well as requires
more savings. On the other hand, in the flat-tax steady state the aggregate capital stock
is very high and can be deaccumulated during the transition. This additional consumption
as well as increased insurance delivers a 14.8% welfare gain per period and a majority
political support. Detailed results in Appendix D show that all but the high productivity
agents support the tax reform.
Obviously, we do not compute an optimal transition process that also adjust the shape
of the optimal tax policy in each period of the transition. Also, efficiency gains in the
terminal steady state are large and compensation schemes could be designed to alleviate
welfare losses from the transition in order to obtain political support for the reform.26
23Steady state average welfare is defined as the expected discounted value of being born into a stationary
equilibrium, expressed in consumption units per period.
24The average welfare gain from the optimal tax reform is defined as a constant percentage increase in
consumption of each household in the pre-reform steady state that delivers the same expected utility as
when the optimal limiting tax schedule is implemented. We guess a sufficiently large number of convergence
periods and iterate on paths of equilibrium prices and tax levels to clear markets and the government budget
constraint in each period of the transition.
25In a representative agent economy, the distributional component is zero. If the aggregate component is
positive, the reform is Pareto-improving if it leaves the distribution of consumption unchanged. In Domeij
and Heathcote (2004), the distributional component is negative and outweighs the aggregate component
as the capital income tax reform shifts taxation to labor income.
26See Gottardi et al. (2011) for an analysis of issuing debt against subsequent efficiency gains.
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Figure 3: Optimal average and marginal tax rates for different government discount factors.
6.3 Different Welfare Criteria
We now relate our results to recent findings in the private information literature that
society should be more patient than individual households.27 In dynamic models, the
social discount factor affects the way how government (social planner) balances efficiency
and equality between the current and future generations (or periods). Indeed, the high
aggregate capital stock in the constrained optimum in Davila et al. (2012) might arise in
an economy whose social planner is more patient than agents. To study this issue, we set
the government’s discount factor in the calculus of variations Ramsey problem in equation
(12) to βˆ that differs from the benchmark discount factor β used by agents in the Euler
equation (10).
Figure 3 shows that when the social discount factor is lower than that of agents, βˆ < β,
the optimal tax schedule puts more weight on current redistribution and less weight on the
long-term general equilibrium effect from the aggregate capital stock accumulation. The
optimal tax schedule for a very low βˆ = 0.89 is actually increasing and convex. On the
other hand, a very high social discount factor leads to a more convex U-shaped average tax
27This issue has been studied in an asymmetric information framework as a tool to overcome the immis-
eration result of Atkeson and Lucas (1992). Phelan (2006) achieves this by assigning equal weights on all
future generations, while Farhi and Werning (2007) place a positive and vanishing Pareto weight on ex-
pected welfare of future generations. Farhi and Werning (2010) analyze a dynamic Mirrleesian model with
productivity shocks and find that a progressive estate tax implements efficient allocations by providing the
necessary mean reversion and insurance across generations. Farhi et al. (2012) study efficient non-linear
taxation of labor and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model without commitment. In order to lower the
capital stock and, therefore, the gains from a deviation, the marginal tax on capital income is progressive.
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Figure 4: Capital-output ratio (left axis) and wealth inequality (right axis) for different
government discount factors.
function needed for saving incentives (see Bakis et al. (2015) for similar results in a dynastic
economy). Figure 4 shows that both the capital-output ratio and wealth inequality increase
in βˆ. When βˆ = 0.99, the capital-output ratio rises to 3.38 and Gini coefficient of wealth
to 0.80. On the other hand, a very low discount rate βˆ = 0.89 decreases wealth inequality
to 0.485. In Appendix D we report all steady state and transition results. For βˆ < β, the
optimal tax reform of the progressive-tax steady state is supported by the majority of the
population. This is because for low βˆs the government prefers a lower aggregate capital
stock, so agents can deaccumulate and consume their capital stock during a transition, and
vice versa for high social discount factors. For the same reason, the optimal tax reform of
the flat-tax economy makes the majority of agents better off.
The shape of the optimal tax schedule is necessarily sensitive to the government’s
objective function. Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2017) characterize the mapping between a
taste for redistribution in a class of Pareto weight functions and the progressivity parameter
in Heathcote et al. (2016). When the taste for redistribution increases, the marginal
tax schedule moves from being upward sloping to becoming a U-shaped function. In
their simulations, the welfare gains from an optimal progressive tax reform are very small.
Appendix F discusses these extensions and other results in detail.
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6.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Finally, we analyze the optimal limiting tax schedule in the benchmark calibration for
different values of risk aversion σ. The U-shape of the optimal limiting average tax schedule
holds in all simulated economies. An increasing risk aversion puts more weight on the
distributional effect relative to the general equilibrium effect and the average tax schedules
become more progressive with higher σ. The Gini coefficient of wealth falls to 0.59 when
σ = 4. In the flat-tax economy, a higher risk aversion induces agents to accumulate
more capital as a buffer stock against idiosyncratic risk (see Imrohoroglu (1998)), rising
transitional gains as a consequence. Because general equilibrium effects are more important
at low risk aversion, the negative slope of the average tax rates is steeper at low incomes.
6.5 A Low Wealth Dispersion Economy
Mirrlees (1971), Mankiw et al. (2009), or Diamond and Saez (2011) note that the shape of
the marginal tax schedule is sensitive to the distribution of skill or income. In Appendix E,
we evaluate our example in Section 6 for a more traditional calibration based on Aiyagari
(1994). The three-state, first order Markov process of the idiosyncratic shock to labor
productivity is estimated from the household annual labor income process in the PSID
data by a first-order autoregression with a persistence parameter 0.6 and a volatility 0.2.
This calibration of the earnings process leads to a steady state with an unrealistic,
low dispersion of wealth. The optimal limiting average tax schedule is also U-shaped
with an important upward shift: the average tax rate at the lowest total income is 37%,
decreases to a minimum of 24%, and rises to 48% at the highest level of total income. The
marginal tax rates are close to zero for low incomes and rise at higher income levels to
provide resources for redistribution and insurance. In this low wealth dispersion economy,
the earnings process is not very persistent, wealth inequality is low and poor agents can
escape poverty easily. This allows the optimal tax schedule to focus more on the general
equilibrium price effect, increasing the aggregate capital stock by 18.7%, to a higher level
than in the flat-tax steady state. The savings decisions of all types of agents are very
sensitive to perturbations of the optimal limiting tax schedule. The degree of persistence
in the idiosyncratic labor productivity process has similar effects to those found in Evans
(2017). In that paper, the optimal capital tax rate balances the general equilibrium price
effect and redistribution. When the productivity shocks are iid, the former effect dominates
and the planner subsidizes savings decisions as in Davila et al. (2012). When persistence
of the productivity shocks increases, the latter effect is more important and the long-run
capital tax is positive. Golosov et al. (2016) and Mankiw et al. (2009) also find U-shaped
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marginal rates originating from a large fraction of agents with low productivity.28
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a solution method for optimal limiting government policies in
a general equilibrium economy with incomplete markets. We think of these policies as
optimal because they take simultaneously into account their effects on the distribution of
agents and equilibrium prices. In our example, we find the optimal limiting tax schedule
on total income in a stationary Ramsey problem. As in Diamond (1998), Saez (2001), or
Golosov et al. (2011), the optimal limiting average tax schedule is U-shaped. The shape of
the optimal limiting tax schedule balances the efficiency-equality trade-off between general
equilibrium price effects and redistribution. In the calibrated economy with high wage and
wealth dispersion, the distributional effects dominate and the high income agents contribute
a large fraction of the total tax revenues. Initially low and decreasing marginal tax rates
improve efficiency by lowering distortions in the economy. When a government discounts
future more than agents or if the latter are more risk averse, the short-term distributional
effect is more important than the long-term, general equilibrium effect from changes in the
aggregate capital stock. Compared with Davila et al. (2012), the aggregate capital stock
increases only slightly but the optimal limiting tax function significantly reduces inequality.
In other words, without agent-specific lump-sum transfers the optimal tax policy would
not subsidize rich agents’ savings at the cost of not providing insurance to poor agents
with high marginal utility. Our results confirm the conjecture in Davila et al. (2012) that
simple uniform policies cannot achieve the constrained optimum.
This paper is a first step for analyzing more realistic models with important policy im-
plications. Our example shows that analyzing linear tax functions or restricting functional
forms to progressive taxation might miss a large part of efficiency and equality effects. The
most important extension of the model would introduce the extensive labor margin. Labor
decisions are more relevant for poor agents while savings decisions are more important for
wealthy agents. In a simplified two-period model, Davila et al. (2012) find that the pe-
cuniary externality might induce the agents to supply inefficiently low effort. Park (2017)
analyzes the constrained optimum with endogenous human capital, motivated by Huggett
et al. (2011) who find that the determinants of endogenous human capital dispersion are
more important than idiosyncratic shocks as a source of lifetime earnings dispersion. Be-
cause the planner in Park (2017) can only alter equilibrium prices, the qualitative results
28Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2017) the shape depends on how much fiscal pressure the government faces.
When fiscal pressure is low, the marginal tax schedule is monotone increasing. As fiscal pressure increases,
the optimal schedule becomes first flatter and then U-shaped.
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of Davila et al. (2012) do not change. However, numerical simulations lead to a lower
capital-labor ratio and a reduced inequality relative to the economy with exogenous labor.
While the optimal limiting tax schedule might motivate poor agents to increase labor ef-
fort, the welfare of poor households could be better improved by reducing the risky part of
their income through a lower wage. Therefore, the redistribution channel arising from the
endogenous labor income dispersion could further reduce inequality and lower the optimal
capital-labor ratio. It is also not clear whether the optimal tax schedule would still display
increasing marginal rates as they reduce the returns to labor and the returns to human
capital investment.
In our future research we also plan to study the optimal limiting tax schedule with
life-cycle income profiles as in Golosov et al. (2011) and Farhi and Werning (2012). With
respect to the class of optimal government policies, an important extension is in relaxing
the assumption on continuity of the tax function. Finally, we would also like to explore
different (Rawlsian) welfare functions and the role of government debt. Further restrictions
on available policy tools imply additional aggregate and distributional effects. One can also
analyze different calibrations with heterogeneous preferences, opportunities to participate
in labor or asset markets. A major task would be an extension of our methodology to the
private information literature. Finally, we plan to make our methodology applicable to
time-varying optimal policies for heterogeneous response of agents to aggregate shocks.
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